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ABSTRACT 
The state of the world is such that the pace of nuclear weapons proliferation 
appears to be increasing.  The growing number of nuclear states and amount of nuclear 
material available poses a great challenge to those that would attempt to keep nuclear 
weapons out of the hands of terrorists and other non-state actors.  This study examines 
how the development of a nuclear attribution capability using the tools and methods of 
nuclear forensics can address that challenge.   
The prevention of nuclear terrorism is a multi-front battle.  One of these fronts is 
preventing state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism.  This can most likely be accomplished 
through deterrent policies where severe and credible military action is threatened against 
would be nuclear sponsors.  However, such threats only have meaning if the sponsors are 
convinced that their participation could be detected.  Therefore there is a need for a 
credible means to determine the source of nuclear materials from the debris of a nuclear 
explosion.   
The current state of a national nuclear forensics capability is lacking.  There is a 
need for a more robust database of known nuclear materials, as well as a need for 
organizational restructuring and equipment development. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Introduction 
Today the state of the world is such that the pace of nuclear weapons proliferation 
appears to be increasing.  The growing number of nuclear states and amount of nuclear 
material available leads to very important questions regarding the means by which to 
keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and other non-state actors.  As 
indicated by a White House statement issued in September 2006, “Weapons of mass 
destruction in the hands of terrorists is one of the gravest threats we face.”  With each 
new nuclear state, the probability increases that a terrorist organization, that does not 
have the means to develop nuclear weapons without outside assistance, might obtain one 
through nefarious means (Carter, May, Perry; 2007).   
As former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has pointed out, “Stockpiles of loosely guarded 
nuclear weapons materials are scattered around the world, offering inviting targets for 
theft or sale” (as cited in “Rep. Tauscher,” 2007).  Indeed the Institute of Science and 
Security (ISIS) reports that there are 1.9 million kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium 
(HEU) and 1.83 million kilograms of plutonium worldwide.  Much of this material exists 
in conditions making it very difficult to track (Hecker, 2006, p. 123).  The International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Illicit Nuclear Trafficking Database (INTD) indicated 
in 2006 that there were 196 known incidents of illegal nuclear trafficking between the 
years of 1993 and 2004 (Hecker, 2006, p. 128).  The following table taken from the 
INTD 2006 fact sheet provides a summary of these reported events that involved either 
highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium, both of which are weaponizable without 
additional processing. 
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Table 1.   Incidents involving HEU and Pu confirmed to the ITDB, 1993-2006 (From: 
Preliminary 2006 Report from IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database, 2007) 
Together these figures indicate that there is a clear security challenge that must be 
addressed.  This thesis will seek to develop a policy recommendation to lessen this threat. 
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2. Severity of the Consequences 
In addressing a proposed plan of action to reduce the probability of a disaster it is 
useful to understand what the consequences of that disaster would be.  It is almost 
unnecessary to state that the conditions that would result from a nuclear weapons 
detonation in a U.S. city would be horrific.  If a relatively small weapon of approximately 
10-kilotons were detonated in the downtown area of a city it would completely destroy 
the area within about a one mile radius.  Just outside of this area projectiles, fire, and 
intense radiation would leave virtually no chance of survival.  Anyone in the area within 
five to ten square miles of ground zero would receive lethal doses of radiation within 
hours of the detonation and be dead within days.  Longer term damage would depend 
greatly on wind conditions, but the generated radioactive plume would cause radiation 
sickness and increased cancer rates for large numbers of people miles away from the blast 
(Carter, May, and Perry; 2007).  Computer modeling using the Consequences Assessment 
Tool Set developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency can estimate some of these human costs.  The following 
numbers were generated assuming a 12.5 kiloton yield in the port area of New York City.  
Such a detonation would likely kill on the order of 50,000 people immediately.  It would 
cause more than 40,000 cases of radiation sickness, with about 25% of these being fatal.  
The radioactive fallout would then be expected to kill or cause cancer in several hundred 
thousand more individuals.  Medical assistance to those that did survive would be greatly 
complicated by the 10,000 hospital beds that would become unusable following the 
detonation, either by being destroyed, or being in an unacceptably high radiation zone.  It 
is expected that surrounding medical facilities would quickly become overwhelmed 
(Heland, Forrow, and Tiwari; 2002). 
The effects of such a detonation would include much more than the death and 
destruction caused directly from the nuclear yield.  In 2005, then UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan estimated that the economic ripple effects of such a detonation would force 
“tens of millions of people into dire poverty,” and thereby create “a second death toll 
throughout the developing world” (as cited in Bunn, 2006, p. 106).  This has led to the 
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estimation by some experts that the cost, ignoring the loss of life, of just one nuclear 
detonation would be on the order of $4 trillion (Bunn, 2006, p. 106). 
B. CREDIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK 
1.  Would Terrorists Attempt to Obtain Nuclear Weapons? 
Prior to committing significant national resources to preventing a potential 
problem, it is useful to determine if that potential actually exists.  This is certainly true of 
nuclear terrorism.  For a great many terrorist organizations the use of nuclear weapons, 
even if they could be obtained, would be counterproductive to their goals.  The massive 
numbers of innocent dead alone would almost certainly undermine the political aims of 
most terrorist groups (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005).   
However, there is evidence that a small number of terrorist organizations in recent 
history, and at least one presently, have nuclear ambitions.  These groups include Al 
Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and Chechen separatists (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005).  Of 
these, Al Qaeda appears to have made the most serious attempts to obtain or otherwise 
develop a nuclear weapon.  Demonstrating these intentions, in 2001 Osama Bin Laden, 
Ayman al Zawahiri, and two other al Qaeda operatives met with two Pakistani scientists 
to discuss weapons of mass destruction development (Kokoshin, 2006).  
Additionally, Al Qaeda has made significant efforts to justify the use of mass 
violence to its supporters.  Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, an al Qaeda spokesman has stated that 
al Qaeda, “has the right to kill 4 million Americans – 2 million of them children,” in 
retaliation for deaths that al Qaeda links to the U.S. and its support of Israel (as cited in 
Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005).  Indeed Bin Laden received a fatwa in May 2003 from 
an extreme Saudi cleric authorizing the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. 
civilians (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005).  Further evidence of intent is the following 
figure taken from al Qaeda documents seized in Afghanistan.  It depicts a workable 
design for a nuclear weapon.  Additionally, the text accompanying the design sketch 
includes some fairly advanced weapons design parameters (Boettcher & Arnesen, 2002).  
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Figure 1.   Al Qaeda nuclear weapon design (from: Boettcher & Arnesen, 2002) 
Clearly maximizing the loss of life is key among al Qaeda’s goals.  Thus their use 
of conventional means of attack presently appears to be a result of their current 
capabilities and not a function of their pure preference (Western Europe, 2005).  
The intentions of the Chechen terrorists are less clear.  However, it is clear that 
this organization has carried out reconnaissance operations at Russian nuclear warhead 
storage facilities.  Additionally, there is evidence that Chechen terrorists considered 
seizing a Russian research institute in 2002 that contained enough HEU to construct 
dozens of nuclear weapons (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005).  Some might argue that 
the decision not to attack the site indicates a lack of nuclear ambitions.  However, the fact 
that the plan was seriously considered lends credence to the possibility that the 
organization does pose a serious potential nuclear threat. 
It is likely that few terrorist organizations seek to obtain a nuclear capability.  
However, as can be seen from above, such organizations do appear to exist.  Sadly, the 
organizations that have demonstrated these intentions have also demonstrated that they 
have the capability of conducting complex planning, are well financed, and have an 
ideology that resonates with significant numbers of people. 
2. Pathways for Terrorists to Obtain a Nuclear Weapon 
Of course to use a nuclear weapon in a terrorist attack, an organization must first 
obtain one.  There are two very broad ways in which acquisition could occur.  A terrorist 
organization could somehow obtain a fully assembled weapon ready for use, or it could 
build one from materials obtained through theft, black market purchase, or provision by a 
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rouge state.  Some have argued that the later method of acquisition is not feasible due to 
the technical difficulties involved in nuclear weapons construction.  Such arguments 
usually point to the years and billions of dollars states put into nuclear weapons programs 
that often fail (Bunn and Wier, 2006, p. 138).  While containing some truth, such an 
argument is flawed.   
The construction of nuclear weapons today with modern machine tools, computer 
aided design software, and easily molded high explosives, all readily available to a well 
funded group, is significantly easier than it was in the 1940’s (Hynes, Peters, and Kvitky; 
2006; p.151).  Additionally, such critics fail to distinguish between the fairly complicated 
process of developing a highly reliable, safe, high yield, light weight bomb capable of 
being delivered by a missile or a small fighter aircraft, from the much less challenging 
task of creating a crude, unreliable, unsafe, low-yield, heavy weapon intended to be 
delivered by boat or truck (Bunn and Wier, 2006, p. 139).   
Finally, the most difficult task of weapons production is creating the fuel.  
According to the U.S. Department of Defense this makes up 90% of the overall technical 
difficulty in weapons production.  Financially this is also true as nuclear materials 
generation took up more than 90% of the Manhattan Project budget (Bunn and Wier, 
2006, p.136).  There is good reason to believe that non-state actors could not enrich or 
otherwise produce their own fuel.  To do so would require large facilities with enormous 
power consumption, fairly advanced technologies, and a great deal of time (Talmadge, 
2007, p.24).  However, this difficulty should not be confused with the difficulty of 
weapons design (Bunn and Wier, 2006, p. 139).  As was shown above there are massive 
stockpiles of fissile materials available throughout the world.  There is much evidence 
that some of that material is currently for sale in black markets, and reason to suspect that 
significant quantities of fissile material is vulnerable to theft.  Thus if an organization 
determined to generate a nuclear weapon is able to obtain fissile material, they will have 




A terrorist organization could also obtain a fully assembled nuclear weapon from 
a state.  This could occur either by deliberate exchange or by theft.  Probably the later is 
the most credible means.  It is uncertain whether a state would risk deliberately 
transferring a weapon of mass destruction to a terrorist group that it could not directly 
control.  It is certain, however, that security is less than adequate at many nuclear 
weapons storage facilities (Gallucci, 2005).  Indeed the recent incident in the U.S. of the 
unauthorized and unintended movement of six nuclear warheads aboard an Air Force B-
52 even brings into question even American security practices (Spiegel, 2008).  Overall, 
lax security among the holders of weapons grade nuclear material has the potential to 
provide a reasonable means of acquisition for terrorist groups. 
Less likely, but none the less possible, is that a state would sell or otherwise 
transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist organization.  This probability is low, because 
once a terrorist organization had the nuclear device, the state could have no assurance 
that the weapon would not be used to blackmail that state, or that the weapon’s origin 
could not be traced back to the host nation (Bunn, 2006, p. 115).  The best way to reduce 
this probability further, however, will be to remove all doubt that the origin of such a 
weapon could and would be determined (Bunn, 2006, p. 116).   
3. Mathematical Model for Estimating the Probability of a Nuclear 
Terrorist Attack 
A number of experts have made attempts to quantify the level of risk of a nuclear 
terrorist attack in terms of the probability of such an attack in the next decade.  These 
estimates of risk generally range from 1 to 50 percent.   This large range can be attributed 
in part to not quantifying all of the variables that determine the actual overall level of 
risk.  To do so still leaves a great deal of room for debate about the individual 
probabilities, but it allows one to determine where their assumptions are being made, and 
provides a means of determining how the overall risk can be reduced (Bunn, 2006, p.103) 
Such a mathematical model has been developed by Matthew Bunn.  In his model, 
the probability that a nuclear terrorist attack will occur in any arbitrary year, Pc is given 
by: 
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where the variables are defined as: 
• Nn = The number of terrorist groups that seek a nuclear capability and 
could plausibly obtain one 
• Pa(j) = The probability of organization j launching an acquisition attempt in 
any arbitrary year 
• Po(j) = The probability that organization j attempts an outsider theft 
• Pos(j,k) = The probability an outsider theft attempt is successful 
• Pi(j) = The probability that organization j attempts an insider theft 
• Pis(j,k) = The probability an insider theft attempt is successful 
• Pb(j) = The probability that an attempt to buy material on the black market 
is made 
• Pbs(j,k) = The probability of successfully purchasing nuclear material on the 
black market 
• Pn(j) = The probability of attempting to obtain a nuclear weapon or nuclear 
materials from a state 
• Pns(j,k) = The probability a state would transfer a weapon or materials to 
terrorists 
• Pw(j,k) = The probability a working weapon could be constructed from the 
obtained materials 
• Pd(j,k) = The probability a weapon would be detonated if it were acquired 
Using this model with the assumption that there are two terrorist groups with nuclear 
ambitions, Bunn calculates that there is approximately a 3% probability that a nuclear 
terrorist event will occur each year (2006, p.107).   
Of course any calculated probability is extremely subjective as none of the 
variables listed in the model are known quantities.  However, reasonable estimations can 
be made, and most of these quantities have been shown to be non-zero based on previous 
acquisition attempts and statements of intent from terrorist organizations such as al 
Qaeda.  Perhaps the most important use of such a model is in determining how changes in 
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national policy aimed at reducing the value of each constituent probability will affect the 
overall probability of a successful terrorist attack. 
For example Pn(j), or the probability that a terrorist organization would seek to 
obtain nuclear weapons or their materials through a state sponsored transaction might be 
quite high.  It is reasonable to assume that this would be the preferred acquisition method 
for a terrorist group due to the lower levels of risk involved in the acquisition process.  
There is probably little the United States could do to lessen the attractiveness of this 
acquisition mode.  However, the total probability of a successful attack is proportional to 
the product of Pn(j) and Pns(j,k), the probability a state would transfer a nuclear weapon or 
its components to a terrorist organization.  This probability could potentially be altered by 
U.S. policy.  One potential way that states could be persuaded not to cooperate with 
terrorists is by demonstrating to the international community that the U.S. has the 
capability to reliably determine the source of nuclear materials following a detonation 
through nuclear forensics and would therefore be able to retaliate (Talmadge, 2007, p.24). 
An attribution capability could also reduce the probability of a successful theft 
attempt.  The knowledge that stolen nuclear materials could be traced to the country of 
origin might persuade some countries to provide better security for their nuclear 
materials.  In the end a nuclear attribution capability cannot prevent a nuclear terrorist 
attack.  However, it could significantly reduce the probability of terrorists obtaining a 
nuclear weapon which is unarguably a useful endeavor. 
C. THESIS SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY  
The purpose of this study is to develop a conceptual plan for greatly increasing 
the difficulty involved in terrorist organizations obtaining nuclear weapons or 
components.  Nuclear terrorism is unique from other forms of terrorism in that it 
essentially requires some level of state sponsorship due to the nature of the weapons 
development process (Talmadge, 2007, p. 24).  Thus, it should be possible to construct a 
national policy of deterrence aimed at preventing the transfer of nuclear weapons, 
components, and technologies to terrorist organizations.  Such a deterrent will only be 
possible if there exists a means of attributing an exploded nuclear device to the source 
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country.  This thesis will examine the current state of such an attribution capability, 
determine what the policy implications are of threatening or executing a retaliatory strike 
based on nuclear forensic analysis, and examine means by which the current attribution 
capability may be improved.  A robust and credible attribution capability should lead to 
the ability to retaliate against a state that willingly provides nuclear materials to a terrorist 
organization.  However, this is merely a means to an end.  The ultimate goal in creating 
such a capability is to never employ it.  The manifest desire is that such a capability will 
effectively deter the actions the forensic capability is designed to detect. 
Additionally, physics places some constraints on the capabilities of nuclear 
forensics and the organizations responsible for the collection, transportation, and analysis 
of the isotopic remnants from a nuclear detonation.  For example, the half-life of the 
isotopes critical for analysis will place constraints on what the readiness requirements 
must be for the collection teams and what mode of transport are available for the samples.  
This thesis will quantitatively analyze these constraints to determine the fundamental 
organizational requirements to implement a deterrent strategy based on nuclear forensics. 
This thesis will use a mixed methods approach.  The organizational requirements 
to implement a meaningful attribution capability will be determined by a quantitative 
analysis given the physical parameters of a nuclear detonation and the resultant isotopic 
evidence.  The policy implications and recommendations will be determined by a 
qualitative analysis of deterrence theories.   
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized in five chapters.  Each of the chapters will build on each 
other with the ultimate goal of developing an understanding of the policy implications 
and necessities of a nuclear attribution capability. 
Chapter I presents an argument for the severity of the threat of a nuclear terrorist 
attack both in terms of potential damage and probability.  It then presents the 
methodology of this research project.   
 11
Chapter II will discuss deterrence theory.  The importance of this chapter will be 
to present how an attribution capability is important in both the cognitive and classical 
theories of deterrence.   
Chapter III will examine the current state of the science of nuclear forensics.  It 
presents a description of how a nuclear forensics investigation would occur, and points to 
the challenges that need to be overcome to develop a robust and capable deterrent based 
on assured attribution. 
Chapter IV presents the organizational implications of implementing a deterrent 
scheme based on nuclear attribution considering the present limitations of nuclear 
forensics.   
Finally, Chapter V presents policy recommendations and conclusions.  
 12
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II. DETERRENCE THEORY 
A. IMPORTANCE 
If a policy is to be developed that intends to deter states from transferring, or 
tacitly allowing the transfer of, some of their nuclear materials to non-state actors, then it 
is important to examine the concept of deterrence.  Here a general definition of 
deterrence is offered, and the conditions that enhance or diminish the probability of a 
successful deterrent scheme are considered.  In particular, building a deterrent policy 
around a nuclear attribution capability presents a unique set of challenges.  These 
challenges include but are not limited to ensuring credibility while at the same time not 
appearing unnecessarily aggressive to potential adversaries and thus altering their risk 
calculus to the detriment on the deterrent objective. 
B. CLASSICAL DETERRENCE 
1. Definition 
According to Thomas Schelling deterrence is “persuading a potential enemy that 
he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of action” (as cited in Talmadge, 
2007, p.22).  Paul Huth defines deterrence similarly as using a threat of military 
retaliation in an attempt to convince an adversary that using his military force to pursue 
an objective will result in unacceptably high costs (Huth, 1988, p.15).  By extension the 
transfer of a military capabilities, such as nuclear weapons or materials, can be viewed as 
a use of ones military force, and thus deterrent policies designed to prevent such 
transactions can be analyzed in the frameworks provided by Huth.   
According to Huth, the success of a deterrence scheme is largely dependent upon 
two primary factors.  These are the credibility of the deterrent threat and the stability of 
the deterrent policy (1988, p. 11).   
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2. Credibility 
The credibility of a deterrent threat is also based on two factors.  The first of these 
factors is the potential adversary’s perceptions of the other country’s ability to carry out 
the threat implied.  The second factor is the potential adversary’s perceptions of the other 
countries intentions and willingness to execute the deterrent threat if the action to be 
deterred is taken (Huth, 1988, p. 4).  Therefore, the success of a deterrent policy requires 
that a country making a deterrent threat successfully create the perception in a would-be 
adversary’s mind that it possesses the physical means to carry out its threat, and will have 
the capability to achieve and maintain the political will to do so.   
3. Stability 
Equally important to the success of a deterrence policy is stability.  This means 
that the deterrent threat itself does not lead the potential adversary to believe that military 
action is inevitable, regardless of what course of action is pursued (Huth, 1988, p. 11).  
That is, deterrence requires a strong degree of reassurance that if the action being 
deterred is not taken, then the deterrent threat will not be invoked (Talmadge, 2007, 
p.22).  Additionally, stability requires that the demands of the deterrent policy not create 
a situation so unacceptable to the potential adversary that action is taken regardless of the 
threat (Huth, 1988, p. 11).  The later is particularly important in developing a deterrent 
based on a nuclear attribution capability.  Such a capability will require other 
governments to share specific information about their nuclear materials generation 
process.  It is conceivable that demands for such normally secret information could be 
deemed as unreasonable, thus weakening the chance of developing a successful deterrent. 
C.  COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND DETERRENCE 
Deterrence frameworks are almost always based of the assumption that states act 
rationally. That is, it is assumed that states make foreign policy decisions attempting to 
maximize their gains while minimizing losses.  Such frameworks also assume that 
mathematically equivalent values for losses and gains are viewed equally by state 
leadership.  For example, a state would attach the same value to the loss of a territory 
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containing some arbitrary amount of resources, as it would to the gain of the same 
territory, or alternatively adversary states would assign equivalent values to gains and 
losses. Merely the sign of the attached value would be reversed.  Presumably there is 
great value in such theories, because they yield predictions of state behavior during 
political crisis (Berejikian, 2002).  
Unfortunately, recent research into human psychology suggests that such models 
are seriously flawed.  It has been demonstrated that decision makers often act in ways not 
consistent with the rational choice model described above (Berejikian, 2002, p.165).  
State leaders are often forced to make many and rapid decisions using large amounts of 
uncertain or imprecise data (Berejikian, 2002, p. 167).  When this is coupled with the 
innate biases of the decision maker, the results are decisions made far more by intuition 
and personal desire than by a rational cost-benefit analysis (Berejikian, 2002, p.166).  
Additionally, research seems to indicate that the level of risk states are willing to accept 
depends on the state’s overall level of satisfaction with the status quo.  Thus states that 
perceive their status quo situation as unacceptable are willing to take significant risks to 
improve their relative position.  This is true even if their actions are more likely to result 
in a worse position than a better one.  Rational actor models of deterrence do not predict 
this behavior; in these models a state’s calculus of the utility of actions should be 
independent of the status quo (Berejikian, 2002, p. 169). 
Thus a new model of state behavior and response to deterrent threats is required.  
A psychological school-of-thought known as prospect theory yields such a model that is 
both non-rational, but at the same time predictive.  The deterrent model based on prospect 
theory relies on the fact that human decision makers view gains and losses 
asymmetrically.  This results in two important implications for deterrence planners 
(Berejikian, 2002, p. 170). 
The first of these can be called the framing effect.  Decision makers are assumed 
to frame decisions in terms of either gains or losses.  Which frame is chosen affects how 
the decision variables are processed in the mind.  This effect is demonstrated by Jeffrey 
Berejikian in the following gambling scenario: 
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Gains frame: Imagine a choice between two options that imply personal 
gains.  Option 1: a sure gain of $80. Option 2: a risky venture with an 85% 
chance of winning $100 and a 15% chance of winning nothing.  When 
confronted with this choice, most prefer the sure gain to a risky venture 
although the expected monetary outcome is $5 less.  
Losses frame: Now imagine a second set of options that imply personal 
losses.  Option 1: a sure loss of $80. Option 2: an 85% chance of losing 
$100 and a 15% chance of losing nothing.  Here individuals prefer the 
gamble to the sure thing although the expected monetary loss is $5 greater.  
(2002, pp. 170-1) 
Again rational choice models of decision making behavior do not predict these 
results.  The acceptance of risk should not depend on whether the scenario is presented as 
a loss or gain, only the probabilistic outcome should be considered.  However, multiple 
attempts at refuting these conclusions have failed.  Thus an implied repercussion for 
deterrence schemes is that decision makers do not necessarily maximize their outcomes 
when in possession of perfect information.  Instead prospect theory predicts that decision 
makers will be risk averse when in a gains frame, and risk acceptant when in a losses 
frame (Berejikian, 2002, pp. 171-2). 
The second, and related, implication for deterrence is loss aversion.  Behavioral 
studies indicate that a state’s leadership “will act more aggressively to avoid a loss than 
to secure an equal gain, and will pursue loss aversion beyond a rational expectation of 
benefits.”  Thus decision makers tend to overvalue what they already posses, relative to 
what they do not (Berejikian, 2002, p. 172).  
D.  IMPLICATIONS OF DETERRENCE THEORY AND COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY TO AN ATTRIBUTION BASED NUCLEAR 
DETERRENT 
1. Credibility Considerations 
There is probably little doubt in the mind of any world leader that the United 
States posses the physical means through its military might to effect grave consequences 
upon that leader’s country.  The realm of possibilities range from small scale clandestine 
actions aimed at regime change, to a devastating attack using the considerable nuclear 
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arsenal at the disposal of the American president.  However, the possession of such 
capabilities does not preclude a rouge nation’s leadership from concluding that the United 
States would be unable or unwilling to use its military might.  Such a nation might 
conclude that the level of doubt as to the origin of a terrorist planted nuclear weapon 
would be sufficiently great to prevent the U.S. from taking action against the maker of 
the weapon or its nuclear materials.  Thus a rouge state’s leadership may conclude that 
the risk of facilitating a nuclear attack on the U.S. and therefore weakening the U.S. 
economy, and perhaps military, might be worth the risk (Phillips, 2007, p. 439).  The 
challenge is to guarantee that the threat of accountability and retaliation is sufficiently 
convincing to ensure all nuclear states secure their stockpiles against theft, and to 
convince all states with potential hostile intentions against the U.S. that any proliferation 
of nuclear materials to non-state actors will be met with devastating consequences 
(“Nuclear Counter terror effort evolves,” 2007). 
Perhaps the most difficult challenge to overcome in a post attack scenario will be 
convincing both the domestic population and the world community that the evidence of 
origin is sufficient to warrant military action.  A lack of clear and conclusive evidence 
will almost certainly impair international support for such action (Phillips, 2007, p. 436).  
Therefore, it is imperative that U.S. attribution capabilities be made public and well 
known by the leadership of potential proliferators to ensure that the question of sufficient 
political will for retaliation is not in doubt. 
2. Stability Considerations 
The U.S. diplomatic stance relative to states that are of proliferation concern will 
affect the stability of any deterrent strategy.  For a state to be deterred its leadership must 
be convinced that military action is not inevitable regardless of their actions.  If U.S. 
policy toward nuclear states is overly aggressive there may be an incentive to thwart a 
preemptive attack by any means available.  Lacking other delivery means and in apparent 
extremis, this could entail the transfer of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists 
organizations that intend to strike the U.S., to obtain whatever benefit that may provide 
while they still have their nuclear weapons.  A state that believes it is on the verge of 
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invasion might prefer this option to losing their nuclear arsenal in a U.S. first strike 
(Knopf, 2006, p. 396).  Therefore, the U.S. stance toward states of concern must be 
carefully weighed against this possibility, however remote it may appear.  This will be 
particularly true if the number of nuclear armed states continues to increase in the coming 
decades as the trend currently indicates. 
A nuclear attribution capability will only be possible if there is an extensive 
database containing the expected signatures from all of the world’s nuclear material.  
This will require obtaining very detailed information about the enrichment and 
weaponization processes used by the world’s nuclear powers.  It can be expected that 
many nuclear states will not desire to share this information.  Indeed for a number of 
military and commercial reasons, the details of nuclear processes are closely guarded.  
Requests or demands on the part of the United States for such information then may be 
viewed as unacceptable.  This will not be easily overcome.  However, it is possible that 
participation in the database building process will be motivated by the assurance that 
participants will be included in the attribution process should a nuclear terrorist attack 
occur (Phillips, 2007, pp. 432).  Additionally, non-participant states are likely to be the 
first suspected following such an event.  This too should provide some motivation for 
participation (Phillips, 2007, p. 443). 
Transparency is another factor that is likely to encourage participation.  As such 
an international body should be the primary repository for the database.  The UN’s 
International Atomic Energy Agency is the obvious choice.  To encourage the 
participation of all states, the U.S. must also be a full participant.  There may be some 
hesitation with respect to revealing some of the U.S.’s nuclear design criteria.  However, 
in reality there is little threat.  If the IAEA lost control of the data, it might help rouge 
nations develop slightly more efficient weapons, but the resultant blast differential in the 
limited exchange possible from such nations would be inconsequential compared to the 
gains from full international participation in the database.  Maximizing yield may have 
been important during the cold war designs intended for all-out nuclear conflict.  
However, in a world were only a few nuclear detonations are likely, the difference  
 19
between a 20 kT and a 10 kT blast do not warrant security measures that would breed 
resentment toward the U.S. for not taking the same actions that it demands of other 
nations. 
3. Cognitive Considerations  
The framing effect discussed above places constraints on U.S. foreign policy if an 
effective deterrent is to be implemented.  A narrow policy based primarily on the 
transmission of credible threats to a potential advisory can carry the unintended 
consequence of placing the country’s leadership in a losses frame.  This would then 
increase the level of risk that the country’s leadership is likely to accept, thus increasing 
the probability that the action intended to be deterred, is taken (Berejikian, 2002, p. 173).    
Various forms of sanctions have the same effect as threatening signals.  They are 
intended to create losses for a state in response to that state’s behavior.  But those losses 
have the additional effect of altering the perceptions of decision makers.  The resultant 
mind frame results in an increased acceptance of risky behavior.  Here again, this can 
result in actually causing the behavior that the sanctions were intended to discourage 
(Berejikian, 2002, p. 179). 
The level of acceptance of the status quo is also an important variable.  Policies 
intended to deter states not satisfied with their status quo position are less likely to be 
effective since defection from the deterrent relationship carries the possibility of 
improving their position (Berejikian, 2002, p. 173).  Thus to improve the effectiveness of 
deterrent policies, they need to include means by which states can achieve a satisfactory 
status quo position without defecting from the deterrent relationship.  Such measures 
could include promises for greater economic development assistance and even increased 
military cooperation aimed at increased national prestige. 
Certainly, deterrent schemes are more likely to be effective when the country 
being deterred is not operating in a losses frame.  Thus policies must be carefully selected 
to avoid creating this frame.  In addition to ensuring that a transmitted threat is credible, 
selected policies must also consider how a country’s leadership will interpret its effect on 
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their status quo (Berejikian, 2002, p. 180).  A deterrent framework will be more effective 
if it contains meaningful rewards in addition to the credible treats.  Specifically for 
nuclear security, this should include additional support and cooperation for programs 
aimed at securing the existing nuclear material possessed by possible rouge nations 
(Nuclear Counter terror effort evolves, 2007). 
The loss aversion aspect of the framing effect may also point to the failure of 
policies aimed at preventing nations from continuing the development of domestic 
nuclear enrichment programs.  Policies that attempt to encourage the cessation of 
domestic uranium enrichment by making low enriched uranium for power production 
available from outside sources may be viewed as an unacceptable loss.  This would be 
true if the country’s leadership placed value in the prestige or security that might be 
gained from having an independent nuclear program, even if it were for civilian 
applications.  From an outside rational perspective the results of obtaining ready made 
fuel elements from other nations might have the equivalent effect as manufacturing them 
domestically.  However, a nation might place an irrationally high value on the ability to 
create such products.  Thus the cognitive theory of deterrence would suggest that a 
country might accept significant risk in continuing the development of such technologies. 
If this is so, then sanctions or military threats aimed at forcing a nation to abandon 
uranium production are unlikely to succeed.  Increasing the threat level could instead 
cause the state’s leadership to place more value on the domestic program.  Therefore, 
policies should be selected that target the level of prestige inherent in the independent 
ability, rather than the behavior itself. 
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III. NUCLEAR FORENSICS 
A. DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION 
Nuclear forensics is the term used to describe the technical process by which 
nuclear or radiological material is analyzed, and the analysis results are interpreted.  The 
samples can be either fully intact, interdicted materials, or the samples can be collected 
from the debris at and around the site of the employment of a nuclear or radiological 
weapon.  The overall process can be broadly broken down into three primary phases.  
The first of these is the collection of the material to be analyzed.  Next, this material must 
be subjected to numerous scientific tests to determine the nuclear and chemical properties 
of the material.  Finally, the data obtained from the analysis is compared with either the 
properties of known materials, or the assumed properties of materials that have not been 
sampled, but have been modeled using computer simulations.  The primary focus of this 
phase is to determine the history, and ultimately the origin, of the material in question 
(Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. 3). 
In addition to the political goal of assigning accountability to a nuclear attack, 
there is a more time sensitive requirement.  Determining the origin of the nuclear 
material, coupled with diplomatic and intelligence efforts, may make it possible to 
determine if sufficient material from the same source is available for terrorist use 
(Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, p. 9).  This would be an obvious information 
requirement for national decision makers when determining post detonation recovery 
efforts, and to provide some level of public reassurance. 
Nuclear forensics is made possible due to the nature of nuclear and radiological 
material, and due to the predictable character of nuclear reactions.  Weapons grade 
nuclear materials do not exist in nature.  To be weaponized natural uranium must go 
through an isotopic separation process known as enrichment in order to increase the 




very little plutonium is found naturally.  Weaponizable plutonium must be produced 
inside an operating nuclear reactor, and then separated from the other elements present in 
the fuel matrix (Talmadge, 2007, p. 25). 
These processes can be performed in any number of ways.  The varying methods 
that are used in the manufacturing processes leave different ratios of isotopes in the final 
product.  These isotopic ratios can be used as fingerprints to identify the likely sources of 
the material.  In addition to the nuclear material, the fabrication and machining 
processing in the enrichment and weaponization phases leave behind other trace elements 
and organic compounds.  These too can be used to identify the processes used, and hence 
the likely source of the material, or at the very least certain potential sources can be ruled 
out (Talmadge, 2007, pp. 25-26). 
In addition to examining the material that did not go through the fission process, 
the particulate debris and gasses given off during a detonation will contain fission 
products.  These fission products contain information about the fuel used for the 
explosion.  Many of these fission products will be gasses that will escape into the 
atmosphere and thus relatively easily collected by aircraft.  This is particularly useful as 
sampling of particulates at ground level near the explosion site may be delayed due to 
radioactivity and general destruction.  Figure 2 below demonstrates the fission process.   
 
Figure 2.   Fission Process (From: Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other 
Radioactive Material, 2007, p. 55) 
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These processes are inherent to the nature of nuclear weapons.  Thus while a 
skilled criminal may be able to foil traditional forensic investigations by removing 
fingerprints, or carefully denying investigators DNA evidence, there is no analog in 
nuclear forensic investigations.  The destructive processes cannot occur without leaving 
behind the isotopic evidence of the history of the material used (Nuclear Forensics 
Support, 2006, p. 10). 
B. HOW A NUCLEAR FORENSICS INVESTIGATION WOULD BE 
CONDUCTED 
The completion of a nuclear forensics investigation will be a lengthy process.  It 
would begin within hours of a detonation, but the completion of the attribution process is 
likely to take weeks to several months.  This is due to both organizational and natural 
constraints.  The availability of personnel and equipment will determine the initial pace 
of the investigation.  Later, the iterative nature of conducting nuclear analysis will control 
the rate of progress (Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. ii).  Such an investigation cannot be 
‘cook-booked’, or made into a set of routine procedures.  The results of earlier tests will 
suggest to investigators what subsequent analyses should be performed.  This is 
complicated by the fact that some tests are destructive and consume the evidence.  If a 
limited amount of material was recovered for analysis, then proper sequencing of the tests 
will be of paramount importance to ensure that all pertinent parameters are determined 
(Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, p. 24).  These factors all contribute to making nuclear 
attribution a lengthy process. 
While nothing can be known for certain about the timeline until such an event 
happens, there is consensus on the general process and rough pace of events.  The 
forensic investigation can be divided into three phases.  Evidence will have to be 
collected; it will then be subjected to a battery of technical analyses.  The data gleaned 
form this process will then combined with information about world-wide nuclear 
stockpiles, and conclusions will be formed about the history of the material.  Within a 
few hours of the detonation, it will be possible to determine definitively if the explosion 
was indeed nuclear, and if so what the yield was.  Within about a day it will be possible 
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to determine what type of weapon was involved (uranium, plutonium, or thermonuclear) 
and its degree of sophistication.  The first few days of analysis will reveal information 
about the isotopic composition of the weapon.  Within a mater of weeks this will yield 
information about the details of the construction of the bomb, and perhaps its origin.  The 
length of time required for this final effort, however, will depend heavily on whether or 
not the material matches that contained in databases (Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. 5). 
1. Sample Collection 
The first step in conducting a nuclear forensics investigation will be to collect the 
evidence from the ground and atmosphere surrounding the detonation site.  The ground 
collection effort will be particularly complicated due to competing priorities.  The on-
scene commander will have to balance requirements to protect the remaining population, 
care for the wounded, provide for the safety of responders, and preserve and collect 
evidence (Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, p. 13).  This complicated set of tasks points 
to the need for detailed planning and training before such an event, to insure that 
evidence collection occurs in a timely manner. 
Following a nuclear detonation, the required evidence will be located in three 
areas.  There will be some material, both fission products and unspent fuel, chemically 
fused with glass like melted rocks in the crater at ground zero.  A great deal of the same 
material will be vaporized during the detonation and thrown up into the atmosphere.  
Much of this material will condense on particulates in the air and fall back to the earth 
down-wind of ground zero.  There will also be particulates and fission product gasses that 
remain in the atmosphere and travel with the winds away from the explosion site 
(Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. 17). 
Initially the two easiest places to collect samples will be on the ground in the 
fallout area and from the drifting radioactive cloud.  Sampling at ground zero will be 
more difficult due to the extreme levels of radiation that will be present.  However, even 
in the fallout area radiation will pose concerns for collectors (Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. 
17).  This concern could be minimized with the design of new or the adaptation of 
existing robotic vehicles to perform the bulk of collection tasks. 
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The amount of material that will be required for analysis is actually quite small.  
Only a few hundred nanograms of fuel material from the nuclear device will be sufficient 
for radiochemical analysis (Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. 17).  Indeed some analysis can 
be done without disturbing the site.  Handheld gamma and neutron radiation detectors, 
such as those depicted in figure three can be used to determine the general nature of the 
weapon and the extent of contamination.  These devices could also be used to perform a 
radiological survey of the area, locating the most radioactive areas.  These areas of higher 
radiation would most likely contain the isotopic remnants that must be collected and 
transported to laboratories for more in-depth study (Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, pp. 
14-15). 
              
Figure 3.   Hand-held radiation detectors and survey instruments (From: Combating 
Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Material, 2007, p. 108) 
The solid material identified by these surveys could then be scooped into plastic 
bags carefully labeled with the sample location.  Similarly, fine particulate matter could 
be collected using absorbent swipes, also individually labeled and stored in plastic bags 
for transport (Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, pp. 16-17).  While very little actual 
material will be required for analysis, it will be important to gather as much of the 
radioactive material from as many locations as possible.  Due to the explosion dynamics 
and chemical processes occurring in the few seconds following detonation, materials 
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from different locations might contain significantly different isotopic remnants.  All of 
these various isotopes may be required in the subsequent analysis (Nuclear Forensics, 
2008, p. 18). 
Airborne collection will also be important for the forensic investigation.  Not only 
will airborne collection pose a lower radiological risk to the collectors, but the skies 
above ground zero will also be far easier to access than the land due to the destruction 
that can be expected from the blast.  Of particular concern to airborne collection are the 
non-reactive isotopes of xenon given off during a nuclear reaction.  A ratio of the 
abundance of Xe-133 and Xe-135 can be used for an immediate assessment of the 
weapon type, because uranium and plutonium fissions produce differing amounts of these 
isotopes.  The half-life of the shortest lived of these too species (Xe-135) is only 0.4 days 
(Garwin & Hippel, 2006).  Therefore, to obtain useful information from these isotopic 
ratios will require the analysis to be conducted within about two to three half-lives, or 
within about 28 hours.  This poses the greatest time constraint on the sample collection as 
the remaining isotopes of concern are much longer lived.  This information will be of 
great use to investigators because only thirteen countries have either detonated a 
plutonium based nuclear weapon, or have enough reactor grade plutonium to form a 
critical mass.  Forty countries are known to posses enough highly enriched uranium to 
form the requisite critical mass (Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. 18).  This information could 
potentially rule out certain sources of the fissile material, allowing intelligence agencies 
to focus their traditional collection efforts on the remaining possible sources. 
2. Sample Analysis 
After the samples are collected and transported to a fully equipped laboratory they 
must be analyzed.  It is not possible to design procedures for this process, as the course of 
action relies on the professional assessment of scientists based on their iterative tests.  
However, the overall goal of this phase will be to fully determine the major, minor, and 




of the constituent elements.  To fully complete this process will require between two to 
four weeks, depending primarily on the number of qualified personnel available to 
perform the analysis (Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, pp. 24-25). 
A wide variety of analytical tools can be utilized to conduct this analysis.  They 
will measure quantities such as decay rates, mass, and radiation spectra to determine 
useful information such as the manufacturing process employed, the time since chemical 
separation, and the radiological history of the sample (Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, 
p. 26).  Table 2 contains a summary of the nuclear signatures that can be examined, and 
what pertinent information can be gleaned from this data. 
 
Table 2.   Relevant Radionuclide Signatures (From: Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, p. 
30) 
3. Attribution Process 
The process of determining the source and relevant history of the nuclear material 
marks the end of the nuclear forensic investigation.  This, however, is not a trivial task.  
There are two ways in which the data obtained from analysis can be used to determine its 
source.  The most desired approach would be to compare the properties of the samples 
obtained from the debris, with the samples provided from all possible sources of nuclear 
material or samples seized during illicit trafficking.  The alternative method in the 
absence of samples provided by potential suppliers is to compare the debris samples with 
the inferred properties of the nuclear materials of potential suppliers based on computer 
modeling of known nuclear processes (Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, p. 29).  While 
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the modeling technique should be possible, it is entirely feasible that retaliatory action 
based on inferred properties would not receive international support or credibility. 
What cannot be understated here is the importance of developing as complete a 
database as possible of the properties of the world’s nuclear materials.  Without such a 
database the ability to reliably attribute nuclear material to a single point of origin is in 
serous doubt.  Currently partial databases are maintained by various international 
institutions containing some of the pertinent data, however, they are all far too limited in 
scope to provide for the required attribution capability (Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, 
p. 31). 
C. CURRENT NUCLEAR FORENSIC CAPABILITIES AND CHALLENGES 
The bulk of the United States’ infrastructure that would be used to support the 
attribution of a terrorist nuclear attack was developed during the cold war.  The goal 
during that period was to asses the yield, design, and location of Soviet nuclear weapons 
tests (Talmadge, 2007, p.27).  This required developing the science of nuclear physics 
and radiochemistry.  Also as a result, nuclear weapons laboratories were created, well 
equipped, and staffed (Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. 15). 
The new emphasis for nuclear forensics, however, is quite different.  During the 
cold war the origin of the weapons was never in question.  The new requirement to 
determine the source of the nuclear material used in an attack complicates the task.  
While some of this in place infrastructure is useful for the current need, it is not simply a 
mater of using the old means for new ends (Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. 3).  Again, the 
primary difference is the requirement for a complete database of the world’s fissile 
material to compare analytic results to.  Currently, lacking such a complete database, the 
technical ability to collect data about the details of a nuclear event far exceeds the ability 
to extract useful and actionable information from the data (Nuclear Forensics Support, 
2006, p. 25). 
Personnel issues are also of concern.  There are only a very limited number of 
scientists with the technical skills required to conduct a nuclear forensic investigation.  
This is in part due to the relatively high cost of educating and training such experts 
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(Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, p. 1).  Indeed there are only 35 to 50 scientists with 
the required skills working in U.S. national laboratories, and most of these individuals are 
set to retire in the coming decade.  The replacement of these individuals presents a 
problem, because the number of graduate students receiving Ph.D.s in the relevant fields 
has declined significantly over the last few decades, and many universities no longer 
offer degrees in radiochemistry due to the low demand.  Additionally, even the existing 
number of specialists would make an emergency nuclear forensic investigation difficult 
because these specially trained individuals will be required both at the laboratory sites 
performing analysis, and in the field at the site of the detonation facilitating recovery 
efforts (Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. 20). 
Currently, there is no single government entity responsible for the attribution of a 
nuclear terrorist event.  In 2006 the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was 
created under the Department of Homeland Security in an effort to correct this problem; 
however, much of the responsibility is still spread between the Departments of Energy, 
Defense, Justice, and State and the various divisions within these bureaucracies 
(Talmadge, 2007, p.27).  While this is almost certainly unavoidable, much can be done to 
unify the efforts of these organizations.  This should entail a standard doctrine for the 
response to a domestic nuclear attack that clearly delineates authority and responsibility.  
This doctrine must balance the immediate need to limit further casualties and care for the 
injured while ensuring that sufficient evidence is collected to determine the source of the 
material used to perpetrate the attack.  Ultimate responsibility for the development and 
exercise of such procedures should be vested in the Secretary of Homeland Security.  A 
unified doctrine and standardized procedures are also necessary to ensure that legal 
requirements, such as chain of custody procedures for evidence, are maintained to ensure 
the legitimacy of any action that might be taken as a result of an attack (Nuclear 
Forensics Support, 2006, p. 2). 
A ground evidence collection capability exists in the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency.  The nature of this capability is not publicly available, but presumably it is 
rapidly deployable and capable of performing the required collections tasks (Phillips, 
2007, p. 433).  While details of the team’s composition need not be made public, there is 
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little need to shroud in secrecy the nature of the team and their tasks.  To do so is likely to 
interfere with their ability to effectively interface with other first responders that do not 
have security clearances, and again to deter would-be providers of nuclear material 
requires a well known attribution capability, not a secret organization.  Unfortunately, 
current government policy appears to be leaning toward the latter. 
The airborne collection capability is also dubious.  The United States has only one 
aircraft equipped to gather airborne radiological specimens.  It is the WC-135W Constant 
Phoenix based out of Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.  The portion of the crew 
responsible for operating the onboard sample and analysis equipment is based out of 
Patrick Air Force Base, Florida.  This aircraft has been in constant service since 1965 
(Factsheets: WC-135 constant phoenix, 2007).  With the separation of the flight crew and 
the technical operators it is doubtful the aircraft could be ready to obtain the desired 
information from a nuclear detonation before the Xe-135 gas decays to levels 
indistinguishable from other isotopes.   
 
 31
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
A. THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT 
In 2005, there was an international controversy as to the origin of the nuclear 
materials obtained by Libya and subsequently surrendered to the United States.  Through 
a process of elimination scientists at Oak Ridge National Laboratory concluded that the 
Uranium was manufactured in North Korea, with a 90 percent or better certainty.  
However, scientist from the IAEA, who also ran similar tests, concluded that the material 
was just as likely to have been produced in Pakistan.  Complicating matters further, the 
United States would not disclose the details of the forensic testing that confirmed North 
Korea as the source.  A process of elimination was used by both the United States and the 
IAEA, because samples of nuclear material were and remain unavailable from either 
country (Phillips, 2007, pp. 434-435).   
Had the known terrorist supporting country of Libya used that uranium to 
construct a nuclear device transferred to and used by terrorists in an attack against the 
United States, could the U.S. have taken military action against North Korea to prevent 
further proliferation?  With an admitted certainty of only 90 percent, and the IAEA 
strongly disagreeing with American’ conclusions, it is probable that U.S. decision makers 
would be constrained in their ability to respond.  Fortunately, this was not the case, but 
the event clearly demonstrated how a lack of verifiable samples can result in an inability 
to conclusively determine the source of nuclear materials.   
To effectively attribute the source of nuclear material will require a 
comprehensive database of nuclear materials and properties, which does not exist today.  
Additionally, archived physical samples are required.  It is likely that new analytical 
procedures will be developed in the coming years as instrumentation and knowledge of 
nuclear processes develop, thus being able to examine older material with new techniques 
will almost certainly be desired (Nuclear Forensics Support, 2006, pp. 31-32).  The fuel 
material that these samples would be drawn from are generally very stable, thus 
radioactive decay slowly diminishing the forensic value of the material is not a concern.  
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Relying on the assumption that these samples can be obtained after the fact is at best 
inviting long delays, and likely inviting the above scenario where attribution relies on a 
dubious process of elimination. 
The most difficult challenge to overcome will certainly be convincing other 
nations that it is in their interest to share some portion of their nuclear secrets.  The IAEA 
is doubtful that some portions of the required data will ever be shared (Nuclear Forensics 
Support, 2006, p. 10).  While this pessimistic view is likely to be fairly accurate, it must 
not stop the formation of a centrally held, rapidly accessible database to support nuclear 
forensics.  The U.S. could then secretly fill in the gaps in the internationally held database 
using covert collection means.  The fact that this has occurred could be revealed through 
planned media leaks to increase the credibility of the deterrent threat, while not revealing 
the remaining gaps in the database or the sources and methods used to obtain the sample 
data.  Again, to have any credibility in demanding the participation of other nations, the 
U.S. must provide samples of its own fissile material. 
The concerns that would dissuade some countries from participating in a 
comprehensive nuclear material database program might be mitigated.  One proposed 
method would allow a small set of vetted analysis to access the data following an event 
requiring attribution through nuclear forensics.  Security protocols enforced by the IAEA 
would prevent all other access (Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. 26).  Such a method, 
however, carries the risk of unacceptable delays.  Certainly more research is required to 
devise a database access protocol acceptable to the world community, but that also meets 
U.S.  access requirements. 
B. PERSONNEL ISSUES 
The issue of insufficient numbers of scientists trained in the field of nuclear 
forensics can be overcome.  Due to the low number of institutions offering such 
programs, funding the best of these programs is a necessary first step.  Other steps should 
include internships for graduate and undergraduate students, and fellowships at the 
national laboratories (Nuclear Forensics, 2008, p. 21).  Additionally, providing 
scholarships to promising undergraduate and graduate students interested in the fields 
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relevant to nuclear forensics, tied to a period of obligated service at the national labs upon 
degree completion, could generate the required numbers.  This model has worked for the 
military officer corps for years. 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTION ASSETS 
It is unacceptable to have only one airborne radionuclide collection asset.  A 
routine, but poorly timed, maintenance issue on the forty-five year old aircraft or a snow 
storm in Omaha could prevent the collection of valuable data that could quickly provide 
national decision makers useful information.  Additionally the 1,400 mile separation of 
the aircraft from the operators trained to perform the nuclear analysis demonstrates that 
there is no serious plan to be able to rapidly sample and analyze the airborne debris from 
a domestic nuclear explosion. 
The time available to sample airborne debris is sufficient that the location of 
basing for collection assets is not critical.  There would be sufficient time for an aircraft 
to make the flight from any continental Air Force base to arrive in time.  What is critical 
is that there is more than one asset available to allow for maintenance down time and 
inclement weather at the basing site.  Crews must be co-located with the aircraft, and 
have the ability to be recalled within only a few hours. 
D. DEVELOPING UNITY OF EFFORT 
To effectively respond to a domestic nuclear terrorist attack will require that all 
responders have a clear understanding of their personal role, how that fits into the overall 
effort, and how the paths of authority are laid out.  This understanding can only be fully 
imparted by conducting realistic training exercises.  Additionally, it is only through 
realistic exercises that doctrine can be developed, tested, and modified to prepare 
responders and policy makers for their response role.   
Recent exercises have demonstrated some success in developing an attribution 
capability, on the technical side of the problem.  They have also demonstrated a persistent 
lack of communication between agencies and between layers within agencies.  This has 
led to improper handling of evidence, and conflicting analyses that were never adequately 
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addressed during the scenarios.  Exercises to date have also failed to properly integrate 
senior level executives into the attribution problem.  This could lead to unrealistic 
expectations, and poor response decisions in the event of an actual nuclear crisis (Nuclear 
Forensics, 2008, pp. 29-31). 
Exercises also need to be developed and executed that involve local and state 
agencies working in conjunction with the federal agencies that would respond to a 
nuclear attack.  The exercises should be conducted in as many of the major cities as is 
feasible.  This should be an iterative process where the lessons learned from each 
exercise are used to improve the efficacy of the next.  Finally, the results and lessons 
learned from the exercises need to be analyzed and distilled into useful doctrine for all 
levels of government.  Responding to a nuclear terrorist attack needs to become a skill set 
for local law enforcement agencies across the country.  
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTION AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
The task of creating a credible deterrent threat by ensuring that the United States 
has a credible means of identifying the source nation of any nuclear material used in a 
terrorist attack falls upon both the technical experts in the field of nuclear forensics and 
the various agencies of the intelligence community.  The collective means of identifying 
the provider will have to stand the scrutiny of both skeptics within the U.S. and, perhaps 
more importantly, the world community (Talmadge, 2007, p. 30). The task will have two 
fronts.  In addition to analyzing isotopic evidence and comparing it with the body of data 
retained on the worldwide stockpiles of nuclear materials, more traditional means of 
intelligence collection and analysis should be applied to determine the source of the 
material.  Both of these tasks have unique sets of problems and opportunities. 
The development of a technical means to identify the source of nuclear material is 
critical to minimize the probability of an intelligence failure that might lead to an 
inappropriate U.S. response.  Such failures have been seen in the recent past.  A damning 
such example is the recent reliance on a human intelligence source that led the U.S. to 
believe that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq retained biological and chemical weapons and was 
developing a nuclear device (Ackerman, 2007).  This failure was in part due to 
preconceived notions of Hussein’s regime and a lack of other evidence.  As Richards 
Heuer observes, “When evidence is lacking or ambiguous, the analyst evaluates 
hypothesis by applying his or her general background knowledge concerning the nature 
of political systems and behavior” (Heuer, 1999).  Following a devastating nuclear attack 
on the U.S. it is highly conceivable that initially there will be little evidence available 
without a means to analyze isotopic remnants.  This combined with the highly emotional 
desire for retribution that the intelligence community will not be immune from, could 
create an opportunity for significant analytical error.  Such an error might be minimized 
in the future if solid physical evidence can be produced.   
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Developing a technical attribution capability by itself has several challenges for 
the traditional intelligence community.  Even if the means are fully developed to 
determine the exact physical makeup of the debris from a nuclear event, it is useless by 
itself.  The data obtained from such an analysis must be compared with the expected 
isotopic signatures from all the world’s nuclear stockpiles.  This is no small task.  It may 
prove quite difficult to convince many countries that it is in their best interest to share 
their nuclear secrets with the United States (Phillips, 2007, p. 432).  Some progress has 
been made toward this task.  There are over 50 nations that belong to an anti-nuclear 
terrorism initiative lead by the U.S. and Russia (Doll, 2007).  However, examining the 
list of member countries indicates some very significant missing countries including 
Syria, North Korea, India, and Iran (Current partner nations…, 2008).  This indicates 
that the intelligence community may need to obtain much of this data from non-
cooperative countries by covert means.  Nuclear forensic means of attribution almost 
certainly will not guarantee that appropriate blame can be assigned; however, it will be 
extremely useful in narrowing the search and ruling out certain possibilities (Biden, 
2007). 
While a nuclear forensics capability is extremely important and must be 
developed, it cannot replace the requirement for more traditional means to determine the 
source of nuclear material used in an attack.  The clues offered by forensic analysis will 
be just that: clues.  In the absence of other intelligence they will not be sufficient to 
positively assign blame for an attack for several reasons (Talmadge, 2007, p. 27).  First, 
as noted above the intelligence community must properly correlate the event residue with 
the appropriate nation’s nuclear materials.  Secondly, the intelligence community will 
have to determine how the material was obtained by the terrorists that employed it.  
Without question the U.S. response will be significantly different if the terrorists stole the 
material from a stockpile without the consent of the host country, than if the material was 
intentionally sold or given to the terrorists.   
Finally, there is a real and serious threat that a host country and a terrorist 
organization might attempt to falsely implicate an uninvolved country by including key 
isotopic indicators from the innocent country’s stockpiles.  The idea that a nuclear attack 
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might be blamed on a third party country is not a new one.  A 1970 National Intelligence 
Estimate indicates that the CIA worried that the Chinese would introduce a nuclear 
weapon into the United States and detonate it with the hope that the U.S. would believe it 
to be an attack perpetrated by the Soviet Union (Zenko, 2006, p. 93).  Such a spoofing of 
the American forensic system might even be easier than what the CIA worried about in 
the 1970’s since all that is required is the inclusion of a few grams of radioactive material 
available from many university laboratories throughout the world. 
For the above reasons, it is critical that the nation use all available intelligence 
assets to determine the origin of a nuclear weapon used in a terrorist attack.  There will 
undoubtedly be some motivation and political pressure to rush to judgment based on what 
evidence the nuclear forensic analysis provides.  This is a temptation that must be 
resisted.  The time constraints placed on the formation of a 2002 NIE was one of the 
many reasons it contained ninety-three pages of inaccurate information with regard to 
Iraq’s WMD capabilities. An additional factor was the fact that the document was 
intended to motivate action, as opposed to merely presenting policy makers with an 
accurate picture of the current situation (Zenko, 2006, pp. 89-90).  This is exactly the 
situation the United States will find itself in following a nuclear terrorist attack.  The 
consequences of another inaccurate intelligence estimate, one that might be used to 
justify a massive retaliatory strike, could be devastating. 
The organizational framework within which the intelligence community is to 
determine the origin of a nuclear device will decide the likelihood of a correct assessment 
being made.  Intelligence analysis is affected by cognitive biases, and analytical methods 
that simplify the processing of huge amounts of information.  While these can be useful 
there is also a danger that they will lead to inaccurate conclusions (Heuer, 1999).  The 
process must be designed to prevent these biases and methods from creating such a 
situation. 
Perhaps the largest looming danger here is satisficing, or selecting the first 
hypothesis that appears plausible (Heuer, 1999).  This is a likely trap to fall into if the 
nuclear forensic data quickly indicates a probable perpetrator that was already suspected 
based on the geopolitical situation at the time.  This, however, would open the U.S. to the 
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scenario that the forensic data was spoofed.  Another issue will be preventing a consensus 
from forming around compelling forensic data before a full intelligence estimate is 
completed (Heuer, 1999).  If this were to occur it might be difficult to present and argue 
evidence of another country’s involvement if this is not supported by the forensic 
evidence. 
To minimize the effects of these and other biases, the analytical process should be 
divided among four distinct functional groups.  The first group’s responsibility will be to 
conduct the forensic analysis and generate a hypothesis based on the isotopic evidence.  
Nominally, this will serve as the primary body of evidence against the supplier of the 
material.  The hypotheses drawn from nuclear analysis can also be used to focus the 
collection efforts of the intelligence community in the event that other indicators are not 
immediately available. 
The second proposed group will have access to the conclusions of the forensic 
group as they become available.  Their responsibility will be to disprove the forensic 
hypothesis.  Since it is their sole responsibility to find evidence to refute the most obvious 
hypothesis they are less likely to inadvertently reject information that contradicts the 
forensic evidence.  This function must necessarily be built into the system as analysts do 
“not naturally seek disconfirming evidence, and when such evidence is received it tends 
to be discounted” (Heuer, 1999).   
The third group should not have access to the findings of the forensic group as 
they become available.  Their task will be to determine the source of the weapon using 
purely traditional intelligence processes.  They should be denied the forensic evidence 
until their initial conclusions are drawn to prevent cognitive biases from interfering with 
the quality of analysis.  It is arguable that this will result in a significant waste of effort as 
forensic data will not be available to steer their collection efforts.  However, this waste is 
a necessary evil to ensure that the final conclusions drawn by the intelligence community 
are as accurate as is possible. 
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The final group should have immediate access to the findings of the forensic 
group as they become available.  Again the task of these collectors and analysts will be to 
determine the source of the nuclear material, but they will be free to use the information 
from the forensic investigation to guide their efforts.  This group should consist of the 
majority of the intelligence community as it is unlikely that there will be a more pressing 
issue following a domestic nuclear terror attack.   
The determination of the origin of a nuclear device detonated within the United 
States may be the most important intelligence estimate ever to be made.  It will likely 
determine whether the President of the United States chooses to conduct a large scale 
retaliatory military campaign, and could potentially be used to justify the use of nuclear 
weapons in retaliation.  An intelligence failure could result in the perpetrators going 
unpunished and therefore significantly reducing the credibility of the U.S. deterrent 
threat, thus increasing the possibility of future attacks.  Alternatively, the U.S. might 
strike out against the wrong country, needlessly killing innocent civilians and doing 
unrecoverable harm to the reputation of the United States. It is therefore critical that the 
intelligence community have a workable plan to determine the source of such an attack, 
integrated with the national nuclear attribution function. 
B. TRANSMITTING THE DETERRENT THREAT 
Deterrent policies and capabilities are meaningless unless they are appropriately 
communicated to the party they are intended to deter.  Not only is the content of the 
message important, but also the context within which it is delivered will determine how 
the message is received and interpreted.  For a deterrent based on an attribution capability 
to be successful the U.S. must successfully convince foreign governments and dictators 
that such a capability exists and that the U.S. would take action based on information 
gained from this capability (Talmadge, 2007, p. 30). 
This is another reason why the U.S. should be very transparent about its 
attribution capability.  To hide the process behind the veil of national secrets will create 
doubt about the existence of the capability.  This may be sufficient to deter a risk adverse 
adversary.  However, all but a certainty of attribution may be required to deter a risk 
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acceptant adversary operating under a losses frame from allowing the transfer of nuclear 
materials to an allied terrorist organization in the hope of gaining some advantage over 
the United States. 
Additionally, the deterrent threat should be made clearly, and without ambiguity.  
This is not in accordance with current administrations policy.  With regard to the specific 
threat of North Korea transferring nuclear materials President Bush said that, “We would 
hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action” (as cited in 
Shanker & Sanger, 2006).  The president and other top officials declined to comment, 
however, on the nature of the accountability.  Many leaders instead said that the, “power 
of deterrence was its very ambiguity.”  Indeed one White House official stated that, 
“These declarations are constructed with some elasticity, specifically to raise questions 
and doubts in the mind of the object” (as cited in Shanker & Sanger, 2006). 
There are certainly times when in international relations deterrent ambiguity is an 
ally.  The U.S. position vis-à-vis Taiwan’s independence is one such example.  Here 
ambiguity is effective because the PRC is risk averse, and is fairly satisfied with its status 
quo position.  Taking an unambiguous stance could actually alter this position and make 
the PRC more risk acceptant in order to demonstrate its regional authority.  This can not 
be said of other countries such as North Korea or Iran.  The leaders of these countries are 
likely to be far more risk acceptant and often operate under a losses frame when dealing 
with the United States.  It is entirely possible that relations with these countries could 
deteriorate even further in the future, increasing risk acceptant behavior. 
As Paul Huth (1998, pp. 2-3) explains, ambiguity creates uncertainty.  This 
uncertainty allows the policy makers of deterrent targets to selectively interpret messages 
according to their biases and desires.  This could provide the room necessary then for 
foreign leaders to decide that the United States would not act decisively if attacked 
through a proxy.  It is not sufficient to assume that the actions of the United States in 
Afghanistan or Iraq following the September 11 attacks would be sufficient to deter other 
states from supporting terrorist organizations.  It appears that the past actions of a 
deterring state when in a confrontation with a state uninvolved in the current deterrent 
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situation have little effect on the credibility of the current deterrent threat (Huth, 1998, p. 
81).  Thus the deterrent threat must be unambiguously transmitted to each potential 
threatening state. 
Huth’s findings have another positive aspect.  Since deterrent threats and 
outcomes vis-à-vis other countries seem to have little effect on how other states view 
their current deterrent situation, it is possible to have asymmetric deterrent policies with 
regard to the control of nuclear materials and weapons.  For example the U.S. should be 
very clear that if attacked by a nuclear device of North Korean origin, that prompt, 
decisive, and regime changing military action will follow.  The policy necessarily must 
be different if the U.S. is attacked by a nuclear weapon found to have been stolen from 
former Soviet stockpiles.  These different policies are unlikely to affect the North Korean 
or Iranian assessment of the dangers of transferring nuclear weapons. 
C. ACTIONS AFTER ATTRIBUTION 
If attacked by a terrorist nuclear weapon there is no doubt that the United States 
must respond, and with devastating consequences for those that facilitated the attack.  
Not only will there be enormous domestic political pressure to do so, but a failure to 
punish such an attack could embolden other actors and invite similar future attacks 
(Talmadge, 2007, p. 30).  Instead the only freedom the president will have is in the nature 
of the retaliatory action. 
Undoubtedly there will be those that argue a nuclear strike launched against the 
country linked to a nuclear detonation on U.S. soil would be appropriate.  Current U.S. 
policy statements seem to reflect this position.  The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review 
indicated that planners view a degree of interchangeability between nuclear and 
conventional weapons as a deterrence strengthening mechanism.  The result is a policy 
that portrays nuclear weapons as both a strategic deterrent and as a legitimate weapon of 
war.  Indeed this position is not limited to the United States.  In 2006 then French 
President Jacques Chirac stated that France would consider using nuclear weapons in 
retaliation against states that sponsored terrorist attacks utilizing weapons of mass 
destruction against France (INTERNATIONAL, 2006). 
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Such language is potentially dangerous.  As Thomas Schelling notes, there is a 
clear taboo associated with the use of nuclear weapons.  This taboo has been sensed by 
policy makers since at least the early 1950’s, yet it is not easy to quantify why the taboo 
exists.  It is possible to make nuclear weapons less destructive than many large 
conventional bombs, yet these so called ‘tactical nukes’ have never been used in warfare 
(Schelling, 2006. p. 6089).  It is the fact that this taboo exists, but cannot easily be 
explained that makes its maintenance tenuous.  Indeed, it is a fair assumption that if 
nuclear weapons are used again in warfare, that it will be difficult to contain their use for 
some time after the first exchange.  It is within the interest of the United States to 
maintain this universal prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons (Schelling, 2006, 
p. 6090). 
Declared policies of first use, or statements indicating that nuclear weapons would 
be used in retaliation for supporting nuclear terrorists undermine this prohibition.  Indeed 
publicly suggesting that the use of nuclear weapons is a legitimate policy option may 
increase the appeal of nuclear weapons and work against counter proliferation efforts.  If 
the U.S. were to respond to a terrorist attack with a nuclear strike, it would only 
legitimize the terrorist choice of weapons. 
There is a need for the U.S. strategic deterrent capability.  However, the quiet 
message sent every time a Trident missile submarine gets underway is sufficient to 
transmit the deterrent threat these weapons are needed for.  Suggesting that the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal may be employed for any other reason than retaliating against a large-
scale first strike from a peer competitor increases the risk that nuclear weapons will be 
used during conflict, as it erodes the stigma attached to them.  Clearly, the U.S. has the 
conventional force projection capability to retaliate against a rogue state’s willful or 
complicit transfer of nuclear weapons.  Signaling the intent to use only these 
conventional means is both more credible, and less dangerous to the long term counter 
proliferation effort. 
 43
D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Ensuring that a nuclear terrorist attack will not occur is not possible.  The best that 
can be hoped for is to reduce the probability to an acceptably low level.  Deterring states 
from intentionally transferring nuclear material to terrorists, or encouraging adequate 
security practices by convincing the world community that the United States will 
determine the source of the material is just one step that must be taken.  Equally 
important are efforts to remove the conditions that cause terrorism, and efforts to increase 
the difficulty of bringing nuclear weapons into the country through more robust border 
and port security systems. 
That being said, decreasing the likelihood that states might facilitate nuclear 
terrorism is absolutely necessary.  This is technologically feasible now, but key policy 
points must be implemented, and international cooperation and transparency are 
absolutely necessary.  The sooner such a capability is in place and demonstrated to the 
world community, the less likely it will be that such methods will ever have to be 
employed. 
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